UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25653
22 April 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 20 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith an information bulletin showing the impact that the sanctions imposed on Iraq have had on the death rates for children and the elderly.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

The death rate for children in Iraq has increased considerably since the Gulf war because of the coalition's aggression against Iraq, which has caused the destruction of health and education institutions. As a result, these institutions are paralysed and unable to carry out their normal functions.

The statistics recently issued by the Child Welfare Organization in Iraq show the following:

(a) An increase in the per-month deaths of children aged 5 years and over: 3,800 in August 1992, as against 2,289 in August 1991 and 712 in August 1990. The main cause of this tragedy is malnutrition and the severe shortage of vaccines and other medicaments.

(b) As a result of the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq since August 1990, there were 61,442 deaths of children under 5 years of age during the period from August 1990 to August 1992.

(c) The total number of deaths among children aged 5 years and over totalled 6,362 per month in 1992, as against 4,872 in 1991 and 1,833 in 1990.

(d) Low birth weight occurred in more than 17.5 per cent of all newborns, while the percentage was 10.8 per cent in 1991 and 4.5 per cent in 1990. That reflects the impact of the absence of good nutrition essential for the welfare of pregnant women.

(e) The number of hospitals and health centres destroyed or damaged as a result of the coalition's aggression against Iraq was 41 hospitals and 20 health centres.

(f) The aggression against Iraq also caused the destruction of or damage to 57 social welfare establishments, including crèches, institutes for the disabled and State orphanages, and damage to 205 kindergartens and 1,767 primary schools.

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23 April 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 22 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that, during the period from 14 to 19 April 1993, United States aircraft continued to violate Iraqi airspace for the purpose of surveillance and provocation and to drop heat flares on some areas, as follows.

14 April 1993

(a) Northern region: 26 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 3,000-9,000 m, centred on Mosul, Dohuk, Irbil, Rawanduz, Tall Afar, Dukan and Zakho.

(b) Southern region: 50 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 5,000-9,000 m, centred over Shatrah, Jalibah, Ushbayjah, Basra, Busayyah, Nasiriyah and Artawi.

- At 1413 hours on 14 April 1993, a United States TR-1 aircraft engaged in hostile reconnaissance over Samawah, flying at a speed of 600 km/h and at an altitude of 20,000 m. It departed at 1550 hours on the same day north of Ar'ar in the direction of Saudi Arabia.

15 April 1993

(a) Northern region: 20 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-10,000 m, centred on Mosul, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar, Amadiyah and Rawanduz.

(b) Southern region: 43 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 5,000-9,000 m, centred on Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Amarah and Busayyah.

16 April 1993

(a) Northern region: 20 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-8,500 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 69 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-10,000 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Ushbayjah, Qal'at Salih, Qurnah, Jalibah, Busayyah and Salman.

17 April 1993

(a) Northern region: No hostile air activity was recorded in the area on this day.

(b) Southern region: 86 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-8,000 m, centred on Artawi, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Ushbayjah, Salman, Samawah, Basra, Jalibah and Qurnah.

- At 1300 hours on 17 April 1993, a United States TR-1 aircraft was detected engaging in hostile reconnaissance over the area east of Basra. It was flying at a speed of 600 km/h and at an altitude of 20,000 m. At 1513 hours on the same day, it was seen departing in the direction of Kuwaiti airspace.

18 April 1993

(a) Northern region: 18 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,000-8,000 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Tall Afar, Zakho and Dohuk.

- At 1305 hours on 18 April 1993, a United States aircraft launched a missile at an air defence site 55 km south of Mosul. As a result of this provocative act of aggression, three Iraqi soldiers were wounded.

(b) Southern region: 59 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,000-9,000 m, centred on Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Ushbayjah and Lasaf.

19 April 1993

(a) Northern region: 14 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 6,500-9,000 m, centred on Mosul, Dohuk, Irbil, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 60 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 7,500 to 9,000 m, centred on Nasiriyah, Basra, Jalibah, Samawah, Qal'at Salih, Busayyah and Amarah.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25655
23 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 APRIL 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 797 (1992) of 16 December 1992, by which the Council decided to establish a United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and to my letters dated 11 January 1993 (S/25121), 29 January 1993 (S/25211), and 1 March 1993 (S/25368) concerning the composition of the military component of ONUMOZ.

Having completed additional consultations, I propose that the military elements of ONUMOZ be also composed of contingents from the following States, both of which have expressed their readiness in principle to make the necessary personnel available: Japan and the People's Republic of China.

I am continuing to consult certain other States and will revert to the Security Council when I have an indication of whether they are also ready in principle to contribute military personnel to this mission.

I should be grateful if you would bring these matters to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

93-23473 (E) 230493

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NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/25656
23 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 23 April 1993 (S/25655) concerning the composition of the military component of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Jamsheed K. A. MARKER
President of the Security Council

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UNITED NATIONS

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General Assembly Security Council

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A/47/931
S/25657
23 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Agenda item 15 (c)
ELECTIONS TO FILL VACANCIES IN PRINCIPAL ORGANS: ELECTION OF A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Memorandum by the Secretary-General

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. By a communication dated 14 January 1993, the Registrar of the International Court of Justice informed the Secretary-General of the death of Judge Manfred Lachs (Poland) on that date, and of the resulting occurrence of a vacancy in the Court. Judge Lachs became a member of the Court on 6 February 1967, was re-elected as from 6 February 1976 and again as from 6 February 1985. His present term of office would have ended on 5 February 1994. According to Article 14 of the Statute of the Court, the vacancy must be filled by the same method as that laid down for the regular election and the Secretary-General is required, within one month of the occurrence of the vacancy, to issue invitations for nominations provided for in Article 5. According to Article 5, the invitations for nominations have to be made at least three months before the date of the election, which is, pursuant to Article 14, to be fixed by the Security Council.

2. The Secretary-General informed the President of the Security Council by a letter dated 19 January 1993 of the death of Judge Manfred Lachs. By a note dated 1 February 1993 addressed to the Security Council, 1/ the Secretary-General drew its attention to Article 14 of the Statute of the Court regarding fixing the date of the election to fill the vacancy in the International Court of Justice. Pursuant to Article 14 of the Statute of the Court, the Security Council decided by resolution 805 (1993) of 4 February 1993 that the election to fill the vacancy should take place on 10 May 1993, at a meeting of the Security Council and at a meeting of the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session. The Assembly was also informed of the vacancy and of the decision of the Council (A/47/884). Pursuant to rule 15 of its rules of procedure, the Assembly decided to include an additional sub-item in the agenda of its forty-seventh session entitled "Election of a member of the International Court of Justice" (item 15 (c)).

3. Pursuant to Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court, the Secretary-General, in a communication dated 4 February 1993, invited the national groups of States parties to the Statute of the Court to undertake the nomination of persons in a position to accept the duties of a member of the Court. The Secretary-General further requested that nominations should be received no later than 4 May 1993. A list of the nominations received by that date and the curricula vitae of the candidates received will be transmitted in separate documents to the General Assembly and the Security Council. The names of the candidates will appear on the ballot papers to be distributed during the election.

4. Article 15 of the Statute of the Court provides that a member of the Court elected to replace a member whose term of office has not expired shall hold office for the remainder of his predecessor's term. The member elected to replace Judge Manfred Lachs will thus serve until 5 February 1994.

5. The present composition of the Court and the procedure in the General Assembly and the Security Council for filling the vacancy are described below.

II. COMPOSITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

6. The present composition of the International Court of Justice is as follows:

President: Sir Robert Yewdall Jennings (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)***

Vice-President: Shigeru Oda (Japan)*

Judges: Roberto Ago (Italy)**
Stephen M. Schwebel (United States of America)**
Mohammed Bedjaoui (Algeria)**
Ni Zhengyu (China)*
Jens Evensen (Norway)*
Nikolai Tarassov (Russian Federation)**
Gilbert Guillaume (France)***
Mohammed Shahabuddeen (Guyana)**
Andrés Aguilar Mawdsley (Venezuela)***
Christopher G. Weeramantry (Sri Lanka)***
Raymond Ranjeva (Madagascar)***
Bola Ajibola (Nigeria)*

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* Term of office expires on 5 February 1994.

** Term of office expires on 5 February 1997.

*** Term of office expires on 5 February 2000.

III. PROCEDURE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

7. The election will take place in accordance with the following provisions:

(a) The Statute of the Court, in particular Articles 2 to 4, 7 to 12 and 14;

(b) Rules 150 and 151 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly;

(c) Rules 40 and 61 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council.

8. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 264 (III) of 8 October 1948, Nauru and Switzerland, which are parties to the Statute of the Court but not Members of the United Nations, have been invited to participate in the Assembly in electing members of the Court in the same manner as the States Members of the United Nations.

9. On the date of the election, the General Assembly and the Security Council will proceed, independently or one another, to elect a member of the Court to fill the vacancy (Art. 8 of the Statute).

10. According to Article 2 of the Statute, judges are to be elected, regardless of their nationality, from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law. Article 9 requires electors to bear in mind not only that the person to be elected should individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured.

11. The candidate who obtains an absolute majority of votes both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council will be considered as elected (Art. 10, para. 1, of the Statute).

12. The consistent practice of the United Nations has been to interpret the words "absolute majority" as meaning a majority of all electors. The electors in the General Assembly are all the Member States, together with the two non-member States mentioned in paragraph 8 above that are parties to the Statute of the Court. Accordingly, as at the date of the present memorandum, 92 votes constitute an absolute majority in the Assembly for the purpose of the Court election.

13. In the Security Council, eight votes constitute an absolute majority and no distinction is made between permanent and non-permanent members of the Council (Art. 10, para. 2, of the Statute).

14. Only those candidates whose names appear on the ballot papers are eligible for election. The electors in the General Assembly and in the Security Council will indicate the candidate for whom they wish to vote by placing a cross against the name on the ballot paper. Each elector may vote for only one candidate.

15. If in the first ballot in either the General Assembly or the Security Council no candidate receives an absolute majority, a second ballot will be held and balloting will continue in the same meeting until a candidate has obtained the required majority (rule 151 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly and rule 61 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council).

16. When a candidate has obtained the required majority in one of the organs, the President of that organ will notify the President of the other organ of the name of that candidate. Such notification is not communicated by the President of the second organ to the members until that organ has itself given a candidate the required majority of votes.

17. If, upon comparison of the name of the candidate so selected by the General Assembly and by the Security Council, it is found that the result is different, the Assembly and the Council will proceed, again independently of one another, in a second meeting and, if necessary, a third meeting, to elect one candidate by further ballots, the results against being compared after one candidate has

obtained an absolute majority in each organ. If necessary, the above procedure will be repeated until the Assembly and the Council have given an absolute majority of votes to the same candidate.

18. If, however, after the third meeting the vacancy still remains unfilled, the special procedure set out in Article 12 of the Statute of the Court may be resorted to at the request of either the General Assembly or the Security Council.

Notes

1/ S/25224.

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/25658
23 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 APRIL 1993 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF FRANCE AND INDONESIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In our capacity as representatives of the co-presidents of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, we have the honour to transmit to you herewith the statement made by the signatory States of the Paris Conference on Cambodia.

We should be grateful, if you could provide for the distribution of this statement as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jean-Bernard MERIMEE
Représentant permanent
de la France auprès de
l'Organisation des
Nations Unies

(Signed) Witjaksana SOEGARDA
Chargé d'Affaires,
Représentant permanent
adjoint de l'Indonésie
auprès de l'Organisation
des Nations Unies

Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement on Cambodia

At the initiative of the co-chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, the signatory States of the agreements on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict declare their firm determination to support the electoral process under way in that country. In particular, they support unreservedly the decision of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia that the elections shall be held on 23/27 May 1993. They call on UNTAC to continue to make every effort to create and maintain a neutral political environment conducive to the holding of free and fair elections, and support UNTAC's endeavours in this respect. For this purpose, the signatory States pledge their full support to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, M. Yasushi Akashi, in implementing the Paris agreements, in cooperation with the SNC. They associate themselves with resolution 810 as well as other relevant Security Council resolutions.

The signatory States of the Paris agreements vigorously condemn all acts of violence committed on political or ethnic grounds whoever the perpetrators and the victims may be. In particular, they express their indignation at the cowardly assassinations of civilian and military personnel of UNTAC who came to Cambodia on a mission of peace. They demand that all Cambodia parties take measures necessary to end all acts of violence and to ensure particularly the safety of all United Nations civilian and military personnel.

They call upon all Cambodian parties to abide by their commitment under the Paris agreements to respect the results of the elections provided they are certified free and fair by the United Nations. They express their readiness to support fully the Constituent Assembly and the process of drawing up the Constitution and establishing a new Government for all Cambodia.

The signatory States of the Paris agreements express their support for and confidence in His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk, head of State and President of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia, for his crucial role in carrying out the peace process and in promoting national reconciliation. They pledge their full support for the determination of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the people of Cambodia to achieve a comprehensive political settlement and to proceed with the election. They also support fully the vital role of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the people of Cambodia in securing the assistance and active engagement of the international community in post election reconstruction and peace-building in Cambodia.

Finally, the signatory States reiterate their full commitment to implement the Paris agreements.

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S/25658*
26 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 APRIL 1993 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF FRANCE AND INDONESIA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In our capacity as representatives of the co-presidents of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, we have the honour to transmit to you herewith the statement made by the signatory States of the Paris Conference on Cambodia.

We should be grateful, if you could provide for the distribution of this statement as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jean-Bernard MERIMEE
Permanent Representative of
France to the United Nations

(Signed) Witjaksana SOEGARDA
Chargé d'affaires,
Deputy Permanent Representative
of Indonesia to the United Nations

* Reissued for technical reasons.

Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement on Cambodia

At the initiative of the co-chairmen of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, the signatory States of the agreements on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict declare their firm determination to support the electoral process under way in that country. In particular, they support unreservedly the decision of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia that the elections shall be held on 23/27 May 1993. They call on UNTAC to continue to make every effort to create and maintain a neutral political environment conducive to the holding of free and fair elections, and support UNTAC's endeavours in this respect. For this purpose, the signatory States pledge their full support to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, M. Yasushi Akashi, in implementing the Paris agreements, in cooperation with the SNC. They associate themselves with resolution 810 as well as other relevant Security Council resolutions.

The signatory States of the Paris agreements vigorously condemn all acts of violence committed on political or ethnic grounds whoever the perpetrators and the victims may be. In particular, they express their indignation at the cowardly assassinations of civilian and military personnel of UNTAC who came to Cambodia on a mission of peace. They demand that all Cambodia parties take measures necessary to end all acts of violence and to ensure particularly the safety of all United Nations civilian and military personnel.

They call upon all Cambodian parties to abide by their commitment under the Paris agreements to respect the results of the elections provided they are certified free and fair by the United Nations. They express their readiness to support fully the Constituent Assembly and the process of drawing up the Constitution and establishing a new Government for all Cambodia.

The signatory States of the Paris agreements express their support for and confidence in His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk, head of State and President of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia, for his crucial role in carrying out the peace process and in promoting national reconciliation. They pledge their full support for the determination of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the people of Cambodia to achieve a comprehensive political settlement and to proceed with the election. They also support fully the vital role of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the people of Cambodia in securing the assistance and active engagement of the international community in post election reconstruction and peace-building in Cambodia.

Finally, the signatory States reiterate their full commitment to implement the Paris agreements.

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Security Council

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S/25659
26 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 25 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a Joint Statement signed between the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Alija Izetbegović, and the President of the Croatian Union of Herceg-Bosna, Mr. Mate Boban, signed at Zagreb on 25 April 1993. I also enclose the annex to the aforesaid Statement, signed the same day.

I request your kind assistance in distributing this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Mr. Alija Izetbegović and Mr. Mate Boban, at the meeting convoked in Zagreb on 24 April 1993, by the Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Lord David Owen and the President of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Franjo Tuđman, in the presence of Ambassador Peter Hall, Ambassador Herbert Okun, Ambassador Peter Ahrens, Brigadier John Wilson, Brigadier Messervy-Whithing, Mr. Frederick Eckhard, Mr. Ludlow, Mr. Brade, Dr. Jure Radić, Mr. Vladimir Šeks, Mr. Gojko Šušak, Dr. Zdenko Škrabalo, General Janko Bobetko, Ambassador Zdravko Sančević, Dr. Željko Matić, Mr. Ivan Jamjak, Dr. Branimir Jakšić, Brigadier Mile Ćuk, Mr. Ejup Ganić, General Sefer Halilović, Ambassador Bisera Turković, Ambassador Muhamed Šaćirbegović, Mr. Kasim Trnsko and Major-General Milivoj Petković, have issued after the meeting the following

Joint Statement

1. In accordance with the Agreement between Mr. Alija Izetbegović, Mr. Haris Silajdžić, Mr. Mate Boban and Mr. Mile Akmadžić, concluded on 3 March 1993 in New York, the six members of the coordination body, i.e. Mr. Alija Izetbegović, Mr. Ejup Ganić and Mr. Fikret Abdić, and Mr. Mate Boban, Mr. Mile Akmadžić and Mr. Franjo Boras, will start working within the shortest possible time.

The coordination body will work on the implementation of the Vance-Owen plan to the extent possible, considering the character of the provisions and the present circumstances.

2. In connection with the renewal of the conflicts between the two armies (the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence Council) in central Bosnia and some other parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have caused many casualties and serious violations of international humanitarian law, thus posing the threat of far-reaching political consequences, the signatories of this Joint Statement hereby order all military units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) to immediately cease fire and all hostilities in all areas where such military units are in contact.

3. The signatories of this Joint Statement urge all commanders and units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) to unconditionally respect all the thus far concluded agreements between the representatives of the Croatian and Muslim peoples in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In particular, they urge military units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Croatian Defence Council to immediately start implementing the Agreement on the legality of both the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the HVO, and on the establishment of a joint command of both forces made up of representatives of both headquarters (enclosure).

4. The signatories of the Joint Statement reaffirm that the conflicts between units of the HVO and of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina are contrary to the policy of the representatives of the

two peoples, and that the continuation of such conflicts would seriously jeopardize the achievement of their political goals, i.e. the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the framework of the Vance-Owen plan accepted and signed by the signatories of this Statement, and success in the fight against the aggressor who wants to break the State apart, occupy its territory and annex the occupied territories to "Greater Serbia".

5. The signatories of the Joint Statement condemn most severely all violations of the rules of international humanitarian law regardless of their perpetrators, both sides having been responsible according to data available so far, and undertake to urgently initiate joint and individual inquests concerning each instance of violation of such rights and immediately examine personal responsibility for the conflicts and crimes perpetrated against the civilian population.

The signatories also agree that the facts be established by a special independent international commission.

6. The signatories urge the cessation of mutual accusations leading to a media war.

(The Croatian version shall apply.)

(Signed) Mate BOBAN

(Signed) Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ

Witnessed by:
Dr. Franjo TUĐMAN

25 April 1993, 0045 h

Enclosure

Command structure for the BiH Army and the HVO

1. The BiH Army and the HVO will retain their separate identities and command structures. Their functions will include all aspects of personnel, logistics, administration, training, morale and identity.

2. They will form a Joint Command which will be responsible for the operational control of military districts.

3. The Joint Command will consist of the two Commanders-in-Chief, General Halilović and General Petković, who will meet on a regular basis, at least weekly. They will form a permanent joint headquarters to be located at Travnik and consisting of at least three high-calibre officers nominated by each Commander-in-Chief. These officers will work together on a continuous basis to plan and control the operations of all BiH Army and HVO units.

4. The two Commanders-in-Chief will form military districts, under the joint headquarters, whose areas will be related to the operational requirement for joint operations and not to provisional provincial boundaries. Their areas will not overlap. Each military district will have a commander and a deputy appointed by the Joint Command. In each case one will be drawn from the BiH Army and the other from the HVO.

5. Each military district will exercise operational control over all BiH Army and HVO units in its area.

Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ

Mate BOBAN

General Sefer HALILOVIĆ

General Milivoj PETKOVIĆ

Zagreb, 25 April 1993, 0045 h

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25660
26 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to inform you that during the last days the Republic of Armenia has once again carried out aggressive military actions against the Azerbaijani Republic.

On the evening of 23 April and on 24 April 1993, the Azerbaijani villages of Shaifly and Kolly Gishlag of the Zangelan district of the Azerbaijani Republic and the Zangelan district centre itself were shelled from the territory of the Kafan district of the Republic of Armenia, by the use of heavy-artillery guns and Grad installations. According to information received, a missile fell on the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

On the night of 23 and 24 April, the regular military units of the National Army of the Republic of Armenia launched massive offensives on the Murovdag path which is on the border already occupied by Armenian armed forces in the Kelbajar district of the Azerbaijani Republic.

On 26 April, the villages of the Agdam district of the Azerbaijani Republic were shelled with heavy-artillery guns and tanks by the Armenian armed forces.

On the night of 24 and 25 April, the village of Sadarak in the Nakhichevan region of Azerbaijan was bombed by artillery from the territory of the Republic of Armenia.

At the same time the authorities of the Republic of Armenia were trying to cut off the last air connections between Azerbaijan and its Nakhichevan region. The Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Armenia made an announcement for the banning of all flights between Baku and Nakhichevan, over the territory of the Republic of Armenia. The flights are implemented by the Azerbaijani company Azal.

As a result of the road and rail blockade by the Republic of Armenia, which began on March 1992, air flights between Baku and Nakhichevan were the only connections between Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan region.

According to information from the Ministry of Defence of the Azerbaijani Republic, it is evident that military units and arms of the armed forces of the

Republic of Armenia were moved into the Agdara district of the Azerbaijani Republic through the occupied Kelbajar region.

As seen from the above-mentioned facts, the current situation in the region has become tense once again and there is the possibility of excessive actions.

We appeal once again to the Security Council, during the discussions on the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council in connection with the situation relating to Nagorny-Karabakh, dated 14 April 1993 (S/25600), taking into consideration the above-mentioned facts, to condemn the open aggression conducted by the Republic of Armenia against the Azerbaijani Republic; and to demand the immediate withdrawal of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia from the occupied territories of the Azerbaijani Republic.

I would be grateful if you could have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hassan A. HASSANOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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GENERAL

S/25661
26 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF DENMARK TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text in English and French of a statement on Angola issued by the European Community and its Member States on 23 April 1993.

I should be grateful, if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Bent HAAKONSEN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Denmark
to the United Nations

93-23831 (E) 260493 260493

/...

Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement from the Community and its Member States on Angola

More than half a year has passed since the first multiparty elections took place in Angola, as an outstanding achievement of the process that began with the signing of the Bicesse Accords in May 1991. Contrary to the expectations of those who participated enthusiastically in them and of those who observed and found them as having been generally free and fair, their significance for the future of the country has ever since been overshadowed by the outbreak of hostilities, violence and destruction on a scale yet unknown, in spite of the increasing efforts of the international community to convince UNITA to accept the outcome of the elections.

The Community and its member States reaffirm their belief that democracy and its inherent values of tolerance and respect for human rights are the only means of overcoming differences and reconciling the Angolan nation. Therefore the Bicesse Peace Agreement and the institutions formed on the basis of the results of the elections and legality must strongly be supported against all adversity be it military, ideological, financial or otherwise, internal or external. United Nations Security Council resolutions 804 and 811 must be complied with.

The Community and its member States welcome that the Government of Angola and UNITA have opened negotiations in Abidjan under the auspices of the United Nations. They express their strong wish that these negotiations will result in a peaceful solution to the Angolan conflict leading to national unity and reconciliation. There is a need for a re-establishment of the cease-fire and an immediate cessation of all hostilities.

The Community and its member States are extremely concerned with the humanitarian situation in Angola. The United Nations has issued a strong appeal for humanitarian assistance. We are prepared to provide humanitarian assistance to the millions of Angolans who are the tragic victims of the fighting. In this context, the Community and its member States recall that they consider it unacceptable to make relief operations dependent on any conditions and that they consider that all sides have an obligation to ensure that the humanitarian aid reaches the population in need, irrespective of under whose control the areas concerned happen to be.

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S/25662
26 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ALBANIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to report to Your Excellency the following:

The Albanian Government has been watching with the utmost concern the development of the Balkan crisis resulting from the unprovoked and chauvinistic aggression of the Serbian forces against Bosnia-Herzegovina. It has consistently condemned the aggression and has warned against the spread of war in the area, with particular reference to the Albanian populated region of Kosova. Encouraged by the reluctance of the United Nations to concretely condemn the aggressor, and in defiance of world public opinion, Serbia has recently intensified its overt hostile acts against Kosova. The situation there has already become explosive, and the danger of the spill-over of the conflict is imminent. Recently, there has been an increase of the Serbian military forces in the region, intentional movements of troops, and low flights of Serbian planes over it, which are a clear signal of the breaking out of hostilities in Kosova. Mr. Qosic disclosed of late to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Yugoslavia that Serbia has drafted a plan providing for the partitioning of Kosova between Serbia and Albania, thus brutally disregarding the ethnically Albanian character and the undeniable integrity of that region. Moreover, everyday fresh evidence shows that the Serbian authorities intend to carry out in Kosova their plan of massive ethnic cleansing which, silently and in various hidden ways, has already begun.

Faced with such a situation which jeopardizes its national interests, Albania has made it clear to the Serbian authorities and to the international community that it will not remain indifferent.

Under these very grave circumstances, the Albanian Government asks the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures, such as the deployment of United Nations troops in Kosova, and all other measures which it deems necessary, to timely prevent the war in Kosova and ethnic cleansing there, with a view to avoiding unpredictable consequences.

I would be grateful, Mr. President, if you could have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council of the United Nations.

(Signed) Thanas SHKURTI
Ambassador

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LETTER DATED 26 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to present to you herewith the joint statement and its annex, between H.E. Mr. Alija Izetbegović, President of the Presidency, and Mr. Mate Boban, Member of Parliament, dated 25 April 1993.

The joint statement concerns the implementation of the Vance/Owen Plan, the establishment of joint command between the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH) and the Croatian Defense Council (HVO), and the declaration regarding the recent conflicts between ABiH and HVO.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter and its attachments as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Mr. Alija Izetbegović and Mr. Mate Boban, at the meeting convoked in Zagreb on 24 April 1993, by the Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Lord David Owen and the President of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Franjo Tudman, in the presence of Ambassador Peter Hall, Ambassador Herbert Okun, Ambassador Peter Ahrens, Brigadier John Wilson, Brigadier Messervy-Whithing, Mr. Frederick Eckhard, Mr. Ludlow, Mr. Brade, Dr. Jure Radić, Mr. Vladimir Šeks, Mr. Gojko Šušak, Dr. Zdenko Škrabalo, General Janko Bobetko, Ambassador Zdravko Sančević, Dr. Željko Matić, Mr. Ivan Jamjak, Dr. Branimir Jakšić, Brigadier Mile Ćuk, Mr. Ejup Ganić, General Sefer Halilović, Ambassador Bisera Turković, Ambassador Muhamed Šaćirbegović, Mr. Kasim Trnsko and Major-General Milivoj Petković, have issued after the meeting the following

Joint Statement

1. In accordance with the Agreement between Mr. Alija Izetbegović, Mr. Haris Silajdžić, Mr. Mate Boban and Mr. Mile Akmadžić, concluded on 3 March 1993 in New York, the six members of the coordination body, i.e. Mr. Alija Izetbegović, Mr. Ejup Ganić and Mr. Fikret Abdić, and Mr. Mate Boban, Mr. Mile Akmadžić and Mr. Franjo Boras, will start working within the shortest possible time.

The coordination body will work on the implementation of the Vance-Owen plan to the extent possible, considering the character of the provisions and the present circumstances.

2. In connection with the renewal of the conflicts between the two armies (the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence Council) in central Bosnia and some other parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have caused many casualties and serious violations of international humanitarian law, thus posing the threat of far-reaching political consequences, the signatories of this Joint Statement hereby order all military units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) to immediately cease fire and all hostilities in all areas where such military units are in contact.

3. The signatories of this Joint Statement urge all commanders and units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) to unconditionally respect all the thus far concluded agreements between the representatives of the Croatian and Muslim peoples in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In particular, they urge military units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Croatian Defence Council to immediately start implementing the Agreement on the legality of both the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the HVO, and on the establishment of a joint command of both forces made up of representatives of both headquarters (enclosure).

4. The signatories of the Joint Statement reaffirm that the conflicts between units of the HVO and of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina are contrary to the policy of the representatives of the

two peoples, and that the continuation of such conflicts would seriously jeopardize the achievement of their political goals, i.e. the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the framework of the Vance-Owen plan accepted and signed by the signatories of this Statement, and success in the fight against the aggressor who wants to break the State apart, occupy its territory and annex the occupied territories to "Greater Serbia".

5. The signatories of the Joint Statement condemn most severely all violations of the rules of international humanitarian law regardless of their perpetrators, both sides having been responsible according to data available so far, and undertake to urgently initiate joint and individual inquests concerning each instance of violation of such rights and immediately examine personal responsibility for the conflicts and crimes perpetrated against the civilian population.

The signatories also agree that the facts be established by a special independent international commission.

6. The signatories urge the cessation of mutual accusations leading to a media war.

(The Croatian version shall apply.)

(Signed) Mate BOBAN (Signed) Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ

Witnessed by:
Dr. Franjo TUĐMAN

25 April 1993, 0045 h

Enclosure

Command structure for the BiH Army and the HVO

1. The BiH Army and the HVO will retain their separate identities and command structures. Their functions will include all aspects of personnel, logistics, administration, training, morale and identity.

2. They will form a Joint Command which will be responsible for the operational control of military districts.

3. The Joint Command will consist of the two Commanders-in-Chief, General Halilović and General Petković, who will meet on a regular basis, at least weekly. They will form a permanent joint headquarters to be located at Travnik and consisting of at least three high-calibre officers nominated by each Commander-in-Chief. These officers will work together on a continuous basis to plan and control the operations of all BiH Army and HVO units.

4. The two Commanders-in-Chief will form military districts, under the joint headquarters, whose areas will be related to the operational requirement for joint operations and not to provisional provincial boundaries. Their areas will not overlap. Each military district will have a commander and a deputy appointed by the Joint Command. In each case one will be drawn from the BiH Army and the other from the HVO.

5. Each military district will exercise operational control over all BiH Army and HVO units in its area.

Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ

Mate BOBAN

General Sefer HALILOVIĆ

General Milivoj PETKOVIĆ

Zagreb, 25 April 1993, 0045 h

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26 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 25 APRIL 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan addressed to the President of the Security Council.

I would highly appreciate this if the letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hassan A. HASSANOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: Russian]

Letter dated 25 April 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to inform you that the leaders of the Azerbaijani Republic and the entire Azerbaijani people are anxiously waiting for the adoption by the Security Council of the United Nations of a resolution condemning the aggression of the Republic of Armenia against Azerbaijan and demanding the withdrawal of Armenian armed formations from the recently occupied territories of my country. The urgent adoption of such a resolution would serve as a guarantee for the withdrawal of the Armenian armed formations from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and would prevent the repetition of similar aggressive actions in the future, which, in its turn, would provide the conditions for the continuation of the negotiating process under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) within the framework of its Minsk Group.

As you know, the latest meeting of the "five-plus-one" group in Geneva was broken off following the occupation by Armenian armed formations of the Kelbajar district of the Azerbaijani Republic. At that same meeting, the view was stated that negotiations could be resumed only after the liberation of those occupied territories. It is common knowledge, however, that this was followed by massive attacks mounted by the Armenian forces against the Fizuli district of Azerbaijan, with the clear aim of seizing the district, as well as against many other north-western and south-western districts of Azerbaijan.

The position of the Azerbaijani Republic is as follows.

There can be no alternative to the peaceful settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. At present, the resumption of the negotiating process under the auspices of CSCE depends on the resolution of the question of the liberation of the territories of Azerbaijan recently seized by Armenian armed formations, in other words, on the restoration of the status quo as at 25 March 1993 (the date on which the Geneva consultations of the "five-plus-one" group ended). Only after the liberation of the above-mentioned territories are we prepared to sit down at the negotiating table within the framework of the CSCE Minsk Group and of the "five-plus-one" group.

We consider that the adoption of a resolution by the Security Council of the United Nations on this issue would be a reliable guarantee of the liberation of these territories of Azerbaijan.

Once again, we urgently appeal to you and to the members of the Security Council on behalf of the leaders of the Azerbaijani Republic to convene a meeting of the Security Council as soon as possible to adopt a resolution on this issue.

As far as the negotiating process commenced on the proposal of the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. B. Yeltsin, and the cease-fire agreements and other agreements supposedly reached during these negotiations are concerned, the effectiveness of unilateral mediation by the Russian Federation outside the context of CSCE is doubtful, since, in December 1991 the Russian Federation and Armenia concluded an agreement on friendship, cooperation and mutual security, which contains three paragraphs on military assistance. At the same time, as members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Russian Federation and Armenia are part of the collective security system of the countries of the Commonwealth.

We wish to point out once again that the Azerbaijani side is not prepared to exchange the peaceful negotiating process under the auspices of CSCE for the mediatory efforts of individual States. Unilateral mediatory efforts by individual States are useful, but only at the level of unofficial meetings to bring closer the positions of the sides so that those matters can subsequently serve as the basis for negotiations within the framework of the CSCE Minsk Group.

The meetings which have taken place recently through the mediation of the Russian Federation, should be viewed from this perspective, as attempts to bring closer together the positions of the Azerbaijani and Armenian sides, attempts which, unfortunately, have so far not proved successful.

At all the meetings, and in Sochi, Moscow and Ankara, the two sides stated their positions with regard to the resolution of the problem, but those positions did not become any closer. In all cases, the Azerbaijani side made the liberation of the recently occupied Azerbaijani territories and the return to the status quo as of 25 March 1993 a condition for continuing the talks within the framework of the Minsk Group of CSCE. The Armenian side did not accept these conditions.

Only during the Moscow meeting was an attempt made to discuss a draft agreement, but that, too, proved unsuccessful since the draft document contained a number of conditions, included at the insistence of the Armenian side, which were completely unacceptable to Azerbaijan.

Reports stating that an agreement had been reached between the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia during their meeting in Ankara are unfounded. Indeed, during the course of the meeting, both Presidents expressed a desire to put a stop to the bloodshed and the view that it was essential to continue the search for a solution to the problem within the framework of the peaceful process being conducted under the auspices of CSCE. In that connection, the President of Azerbaijan made the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian armed formations from the recently occupied territories of Azerbaijan, in accordance with the statement by the President of the Security Council of the United Nations of 6 April 1993, a condition which would permit the continuation of the negotiating process. The President of Armenia, on the other hand, once again stated that the Republic of Armenia was not participating in the occupation of the Azerbaijani territories. This uncooperative position left no possibility for any substantive talks whatsoever.

Attempts to present the statement of views as the beginning of a process of drawing the positions of the sides closer together has only one goal - to prevent the Security Council from adopting an appropriate resolution on the matter and to gain time and thereby legalize the latest seizure of the Kelbajar district of Azerbaijan, as has virtually occurred in the case of the previously occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

As for reports that agreement had been reached on a cease-fire, this agreement was reached only for a fixed short period of time and applied only to a limited area of operations - along the route followed by the CSCE group. At the present time, the cease-fire agreement is being violated by the Armenian side and many districts of Azerbaijan are currently being subjected to massive artillery and missile bombardment.

Thus, contacts between the two sides, both in Geneva and in Moscow, Sochi and Ankara, have demonstrated quite clearly that the Armenian side is disregarding the demand that it withdraw its forces from the territory of the Kelbajar district of Azerbaijan contained in the statement by the President of the Security Council of the United Nations of 6 April 1993. This has led us to conclude that the only way to influence the Armenian side may be the adoption of an appropriate resolution by the Security Council. In this connection, the Azerbaijani Republic, true to the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes, appeals to the Security Council to take the necessary measures in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Sir,

I have the honour, on behalf of the leaders of the Azerbaijani Republic, to appeal to you and to the members of the Security Council, in the light of the foregoing, to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the question of the adoption by the Council of a resolution condemning the aggression against Azerbaijan and thus open the only way for the continuation of the peaceful negotiating process within the framework of CSCE.

I take this opportunity to convey to you the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Tofik GASIMOV
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Azerbaijani Republic

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forth-eighth session
Item 71 of the preliminary list*
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 26 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the statement issued on 14 April 1993 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway in connection with the decision of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 71 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Martin HUSLID
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/48/50.

ANNEX

Statement issued on 14 April 1993 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway in connection with the joint statement of the depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons concerning the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the said Treaty

Norway is deeply concerned by the non-acceptance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its decision to withdraw from the Treaty. It would be in the interest of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to remain a Party to the NPT and to adhere fully to its obligations. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must also permit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect its nuclear facilities.

Norway fully endorses the declaration made by the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which are the depositaries of the Treaty, calling upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reverse its decision to withdraw from the NPT (S/25515, annex). The decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea constitutes a serious threat to regional and international stability.

Norway has, on several occasions, both bilaterally and at the United Nations, urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reverse its decision and to adhere fully to its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached communication which he has received from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Annex

Letter dated 26 April 1993 from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

Please find attached the report of the eighteenth IAEA inspection in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). You may deem it appropriate to transmit the report to the members of the Security Council. I remain, of course, available with the Chief Inspector, Mr. Demetrius Perricos, for any consultation you or the Council may wish to have.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

Appendix

REPORT ON THE EIGHTEENTH IAEA ON-SITE INSPECTION IN IRAQ
UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991)

3 - 11 March 1993

SALIENT POINTS

- The team spent eight days in Iraq from the 3 - 11 March and despite the loss of one full day because of Ramadan most of the planned activities were carried out. By splitting the team into 3-5 groups working in parallel, 35 sites were inspected. Helicopters were used extensively.

- Three facilities were inspected for the first time, including the Saddam University in Baghdad. During this visit, the Iraqi side attempted to restrict access rights of the inspection team, but they quickly changed their position and the inspection proceeded without difficulty.

- An inspection at the Hatteen Establishment, which was a follow-up on a quantity of RDX explosives stored there was extended to include workshops. The workshops were found to contain 242 machine tools, a large number of which, in the opinion of the team, should have been included as dual-use items in the declarations made by Iraq under Annex 3 of the Agency's long term monitoring plan approved in UNSC resolution 715. The machine tools were identified and the specifications will be evaluated.

- Activities aimed at verifying new information provided by the Iraqi side in their January 1993 Annex 3-related declaration were carried out at a number of sites. Short notice inspections were used to monitor the utilization of machine tools and to verify that the equipment was not being used for proscribed purposes.

- A number of sites were inspected as part of an on-going investigation as to whether any type of nuclear facility (not only reactors) had been built underground. The immediate in-field conclusions were negative.

- A major effort concentrated on identifying and separating a large number of radiation sources. Those which are permitted for use in applications in agriculture and industry, will eventually be released according to established procedures. Other sources such as radium, tritium, etc., will be kept under IAEA control.

- A number of technical discussions took place covering areas such as inadequacies in the Iraqi Annex 3-related declarations, long term monitoring procedures, the assistance to be provided by Iraq on the removal of irradiated fuel, nuclear material balance inconsistencies and Iraqi studies involving uranium tritide.

- Regrettably, no progress can be reported on the provision by Iraq of information about foreign procurement and its procurement network. In this area, Iraq is still far from complying with the request of the IAEA. The IAEA-18 team requested, in writing, detailed procurement information for all equipment, components and raw materials, listed in Annex 3, which were used or intended for use in nuclear related research, development and production. The information requested covered not only the manufacturers' names, but the names of intermediate suppliers and other companies in the procurement chain. Information on companies and individuals that provided technical advice on procurement, utilization and design information was also requested.

  As a matter of priority (and as a demonstration of forthcomingness), the Iraqi authorities were again requested to provide answers relevant to the procurement of maraging steel.

  The Iraqi side replied that the IAEA had a great deal of information on the subject including that obtained from outside sources. They considered that these questions were too general, that dealing with such general questions was impractical and that such an attitude was aimed at maintaining the conditions for continuance of the embargo. A copy of this correspondence is provided as an attachment to this report.

INTRODUCTION

1. This report summarizes the results of the eighteenth inspection mission carried out in Iraq by the IAEA under United Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991) with the assistance and co-operation of the Special Commission of the United Nations. The mission took place from 3 to 11 March 1993 and was headed by Mr. Demetrius Perricos of the IAEA as Chief Inspector. The team consisted of 23 inspectors (comprising 12 nationalities) and support staff.

2. The objectives of the mission were broadly:

- perform activities concerning the inventory of materials, equipment and machine tools relevant to the revised Annex 3 of the Agency plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of part C of United Nations Security Council resolution 687 [1991]. This plan was approved in UNSC resolution 715 [1991].

- follow-up activities on the nuclear material balance;

- carry out short notice inspections at selected sites to monitor the utilization of equipment and to verify newly available information on equipment and materials;

- carry out a nuclear inspection for the first time at a university site - the Saddam University;

- discuss with Iraqi counterparts the Annex 3 updating, including clarification of their declaration and its completeness, plans and requirements for implementing the long term monitoring, and discuss questions raised by ongoing analysis of data in Vienna;

- carry out a systematic search of several sites where information suggested that underground facilities, including a possible plutonium production reactor, might be concealed;

follow-up activities on weaponization.

3. Inspections were carried out at 35 sites. These are listed in Table 1.

Table 1
List of sites inspected

1. Tuwaitha, including locations B and C
2. Ash Shakyli storage
3. Al Nafad storage
4. Al Hamath
5. Tarmiya
6. Ash Sharqat
7. Al Atheer
8. Al Jezira
9. Al Rabiyah
10. Al Dijjla
11. Nassr State Establishment (Taji)
12. Al Qa Qaa
13. Al Hatteen Establishment
14. State Enterprise for Heavy Engineering Equipment (Daura)
15. Badr
16. Al Meelah Centre (new name for what used to be part of Badr)
17. Auqba bin Nafi State Establishment
18. Iskandariya Car Factory
19. Salah al Din Electronics Plant (SAAD-13)
    Salah al Din Housing Project (SAAD-14)
20. Al Kindi Establishment (SAAD-16)

21. Ibn Al Haytham Centre

22-25 Four sites identified in a nuclear power plant siting study - Baiji
Abu Dalaf
Al Mihzam
Al Abbasiya

26. Saddam University
27. Fallujah Lead Recovery Plant
28. MIC Stores (North of Baghdad)
29. Kahn Dari Warehouses
30. Al Rafah Centre (part of Saddam State Establishment)
31. Jaber bin Haythan (SAAD-24)
32. Badoush Dam
33. Al Musayyib Power Plant
34. Dhu Al Fiqar (part of Saddam State Establishment)
35. Al Ameer Factory (part of Saddam State Establishment)

ACTIVITIES RELATED TO WEAPONIZATION

4. The team made a monitoring inspection at the Al Kindi (SAAD 16) establishment just north of Mosul. Al Kindi is a facility for military research and development, in particular, the pyrotechnics and propellants used in rockets. The site has been thoroughly reconstructed after severe destruction during the Gulf War. The facilities at the site have features that could be useful in development of small quantities of explosives such as those used in a nuclear weapons development program. It also has some good quality machine shops for fabricating non-explosive materials, an electroplating capability and a primitive capability for the machining of high explosives. The reconstruction effort has proceeded since the visit in November 1992. More buildings have been completed and additional equipment has last been installed. No nuclear related activities prohibited under UNSCR 687 were observed.

5. The former PC-3 nuclear program published an extensive design study for a project to produce and store uranium tritides. Storage of hydrogen through absorption on uranium metal powders is a well-known technique. The Iraqi program manager and design engineer described their plans to the inspection team for handling millicurie

quantities of tritium for self illuminating signs and markers. They produced samples of such signs that they said contained tritium purchased in millicurie amounts from commercial suppliers. They claimed that the design study available to IAEA was in support of this program. The design study is, however, for quantities of tritium on the order of tens of thousands of curies. The required technologies for the two applications are very different, quantitatively and qualitatively. This discrepancy was pointed out to the Iraqi side, who strongly maintained that the purpose was exactly as stated. The Iraqi version does not address the questions of the inspection team. Therefore, a possible conclusion may be that the uranium tritides project design study was in direct support to the Iraqi nuclear weapons development programme. The inspection team also raised questions regarding lithium separation activities and subsequent irradiation. The Iraqi response was that they never contemplated much less carried out such work.

6. Approximately 250 tonnes of HMX (High Melting Point Explosive) remain under seal in six bunkers at the Al Qa Qaa high explosives plant near Al Musayyib. The Iraqi side requested access for a safety inspection because the material has been locked up without safety checks for over a year. The seals were removed to allow this inspection and the bunkers were resealed. The Iraqi side has requested the release of this material for civil applications but they have not responded to IAEA requests for more specific information.

7. The inspection team also examined for the first time a store of RDX high explosive maintained at the Al Qa Qaa site. RDX is a high quality explosive with many applications. Its use in Iraq is subject to monitoring by IAEA under the requirements of the long term monitoring plan. A sample was taken. The RDX manufacturing facility at Al Qa Qaa was destroyed during the Gulf War and it has not been put back into operation. A store of RDX being used at the Al Hatteen State Establishment in the manufacture of military ordnance was also inspected.

ACTIVITIES RELATED TO NUCLEAR MATERIALS

8. A primary and continuing objective of the IAEA inspections in Iraq is the verification of the correctness and completeness of Iraqi nuclear material declarations. The nuclear materials subject to safeguards inspection prior to the Gulf War are long since accounted for. None of the enriched materials, including highly enriched uranium (~ 45 kg U-235) in the form of fresh and irradiated reactor fuel, had been diverted to the Iraqi clandestine programme. The highly enriched fresh fuel was removed from Iraq in November 1991 (IAEA-8). Negotiations are progressing for the removal of the irradiated fuel during the remainder of 1993. The small quantity of plutonium (~ 6 g) produced in the course of the separation experiments at Tuwaitha has also been removed. With the exception of small quantities of natural uranium still to be recovered from waste at the Al Jezira site, all declared bulk uranium stock and intermediate process materials (total ~ 550 t uranium) have been verified and are maintained under seal at a single location. Most of this material, in the form of yellow cake, - about one-fifth declared after the Gulf War to have come from indigenous production and four-fifths from external sources - was never included in the pre-war safeguards inspection regime.

9. It is not possible to establish the completeness of Iraqi nuclear material declarations through traditional material accountancy. Efforts to independently confirm quantities of un-safeguarded nuclear materials (much of it in the form of yellow cake delivered to Iraq by external sources) have not been successful. Further, while daily production records for the Al Qaim facility have been presented and reviewed by inspection teams, there is no way to verify the completeness of these records. Considerable effort has been expended in an attempt to develop an internally consistent picture of how quantities of nuclear material from the different origins were utilized. This origin based accouniancy has largely been an effort to match inspection team measured material, presented in various physical and chemical forms, with Iraqi descriptions of material flows through the declared processes. The identification of a quantity of material with an origin is being done through highly precise isotopic and impurity measurements. The resulting picture does not provide assurance that all nuclear

materials have been declared and presented but inconsistencies do provide the technical basis and direction for looking further.

10. The Iraqi nuclear material flow chart changed considerably between the time it was first presented and the "full, final and complete" declaration (see Figure 1). The various revisions in the nuclear material flow chart were made by the Iraqi side in response to inconsistencies identified by inspection teams. With the "full, final and complete" declaration of June 1992 the Iraqi side's response to remaining inconsistencies was that "any differences in weights existing in the chart of nuclear material as verified by the Agency are attributed to either losses of the material during the bombing or mixing of the material during the evacuation or the inaccuracy of the analysis of the samples". They went onto say that they considered that the "nuclear material file is closed".

11. An accumulation of sample analysis data from precise measurements of uranium isotopics and impurities in selected samples are now casting doubt on major elements of the Iraqi side's nuclear material declarations. The declarations in question involve the activities, identified as the "30 July Project" (see Figure 1 and the twelfth inspection report) carried out in the building 73 complex - Tuwaitha (Figures 2 and 3) and a large quantity of UO_2 reportedly imported from Brazil. A description of the specific declarations and the verification findings follows:

Declarations: Building 73a was involved in a variety of fuel fabrication activities utilizing 2,260 kgs of natural uranium (UO_2) from Italy (safeguarded material) and 59 kgs of natural uranium (UO_4) from Akashat/Al Qaim (non-safeguarded material). The 37 air filters (ref. 1 of Figure 1), containing ~ 50 kg of natural uranium and currently stored under Agency seal at Location C, were declared to have been installed in building 73a. In addition, waste associated with the activities of buildings 73a and 73b was presented.

Verification Findings: The natural concentration of the uranium isotope U-234 is constant within a single uranium ore deposit but highly variable across geographical separate ore bodies (see for example L.U. Joski, et al

J. Radioanal. Chem., 67 (1981) 47 and 79 (1983) 317). Figure 4 shows U-234/U-235 isotopic ratio measurements for 3 samples of the Italian UO_2, 3 samples of the Akashat/Al Qaim UO_4, samples from 8 of the 37 air filters declared to have been installed in building 73a and 2 samples of waste slurry identified with building 73a activities. The results shown in Figure 4, with further confirmation provided by the impurity analyses, clearly contradict the Iraqi side's declaration that the bulk of the material utilized in building 73a was of Italian origin. Either the filters were installed elsewhere than declared (the Iraqi side has indicated that there was no filtration system in building 73c) or the activities carried out in building 73a involved extensive and undeclared utilization of material other than or in addition to the Italian UO_2. It is possible that the additional material processed in building 73a was associated with the Iraqi uranium metallurgy programme and this could indicate a much larger violation of the safeguards agreement than was disclosed at the time of the eleventh mission.

Declaration: Iraq received 23.5 tonnes of natural uranium as UO_2 from Brazil. A quantity amounting to 3.4 tonnes was processed for the enrichment programme (presented mainly as UCl_4 or ADU). The remaining 20.1 tonnes, contained in 201 drums, was never processed.

Verification Findings: The total quantity of uranium verified as contained in the 201 drums is 18.2 tonnes, not the 20.1 tonnes declared. Moreover, when the randomly selected drums were opened for sampling, inspectors noted that material was present in three distinctly different physical forms:

- fine powder;
- granulated material; and
- a mixture of the granulated material and powder.

The Brazilian uranium originates from monazite ore and, as such, should contain traces of thorium. Impurity analyses indicate that the granulated material contains significant amounts of thorium while the fine powder contains no thorium. In fact, the broader impurity results suggest that the fine powder is Iraqi UO_2 produced at Al Jezira. During the eighteenth inspection every one of the 201 drums was opened and the physical form of the material noted. An additional 16 samples were collected. Preliminary results suggest that at least two-thirds of the material presented as Brazilian UO_2 had some other origin.

12. The verification data from the building 73a filters and the Brazilian UO_2 were discussed at length with the Iraqi side. They indicated that they could not dispute the results but could offer no explanation either. They reiterated at length that all nuclear materials in Iraq had been declared and presented. Formal requests for clarification and the corresponding responses were along the lines taken in connection with the full, final and complete declaration. They indicated that part of the material was recovered under difficult circumstances and that some mixing was unavoidable.

13. Since the third inspection (July 1991) a large number of radiation sources had been maintained under seal in building 33 at Location C adjacent to the Tuwaitha Center. The Iraqi side has, on several occasions, requested the release of specific sources for medical and agriculture applications. A major effort undertaken in the course of IAEA-18 was the verification of the gamma and neutron sources. The large quantity of equipment necessary for this task was transported from Vienna. With the exception of some large drum sources, a few alpha sources and one container where Co-60 pellets are stored (Iraqi declaration), all sources were verified. The original activities range from a few tenths of a μ Ci to more than 1000 Ci. The sources encountered were:

Number of Sources	Type of Sources
52	Co-60
32	Cs-137
22	Ra-226
16	AmBe
16	C-14
11	Eu-152
6	Ba-133
5	H-3
5	Sr-90
2	Cf-252
2	Ir-192
2	Hg-203
2	Na-22
2	Co-57
2	Th-232

Additionally, 7 uranyl compounds and a few other small laboratory and waste sources were found. All sources were catalogued, identified with a specific storage location and sealed. Most of the sources are allowed under UNSCR 687 and releasable subject to the appropriate requests from the Iraqi side and the necessary approvals from IAEA.

14. Other nuclear material related follow-up activities carried out during IAEA-18 included:

- the adjustment of water levels and the collection of water samples from the irradiated fuel storage containers at Location B and at the IRT-5000 reactor. In both instances water samples were collected to provide a continuing check on the integrity of the fuel cladding;

- the collection of an additional 12 samples of uranium metal to support the on-going investigation of the Iraqi uranium metallurgy programme;

- An inspection of the Tuwaitha waste treatment and storage facilities (buildings 36, 39 and 40). Activity levels were measured at a number of locations. A collection of uranium bearing air filters, sintering furnaces and glove boxes was discovered in building 36. Samples were taken for further evaluation.

- A quantity of uranium (0.7 kg LEU and 26 kg depleted) in a highly dilute nitric acid solution, recovered from EMIS operations at Tarmiya, had been stored in large tanks in building 62, Tarmiya (Figure 5) since the third inspection. The transfer of this material to Location C, Tuwaitha at the request of IAEA was confirmed by the eighteenth inspection team.

ACTIVITIES RELATED TO EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS

15. The issue of procurement data was again discussed at length with the Iraqi side. The questions regarding the manufacture and supplier of the 350 grade maraging steel, specifically put forward in the context of the offer made to the Chief Inspector, IAEA-16, to clarify specific procurement issues, remain unanswered. Another formal request regarding procurement information for all equipment, components and raw materials listed in Annex 3, which were used or intended for use in nuclear related research, development and production was transmitted to

the Iraqi side during IAEA-18. The information requested covered not only the manufacturer's names, but the names of intermediate suppliers and other companies in the procurement chain. Information on companies and individuals that provided technical advice on procurement utilization and design information was also requested. The request and the Iraqi response are shown as Attachments 1 and 2.

16. The Al Rabiya mechanical workshop (a.k.a. Al Rabee and now called the Al Nidda Establishment) at Zaafaraniya was largely destroyed by a cruise missile attack on 17 January 1993. The facility was visited (27 January 1993) by the seventeenth IAEA inspection team which reported that the facility was being rapidly re-built through a huge, round-the-clock effort. An inspection by the eighteenth team was carried out to check on progress. All buildings have been re-built and handed over to the factory. The last building was completed on 4 March. A number of pieces of equipment that had been removed to the neighboring Al Dijjla facility in the aftermath of the bombing have been repaired and returned. No repair has been attempted on the large turning and milling machines (useful for machining EMIS components) because of a lack of spare parts.

17. A total of 14 inspections were carried out in connection with equipment and material verifications related to Iraqi Annex 3 declarations handed over to the inspection team at the conclusion of IAEA-17. A machine tool expert was included in the team for further technical evaluation of specific pieces of equipment. Two of the inspections involved equipment located in Ash Shakyli warehouse 14a and at Al Tuwaitha - buildings 9, 82 and 90. The remaining 12 inspections were focused on equipment and materials located in State Establishments:

1. Nassr Establishment (Taji)
2. Al Hatteen Establishment
3. State Enterprise for Heavy Engineering Equipment (Daura)
4. Badr
5. Al Meelah Centre (part of Badr - new name)
6. Auqba bin Nafi

* 7. Iskandariya Car Factory
* 8. Ibn Al Haytham
9. MIC North Baghdad Stores
* 10. Al Rafah Centre (part of Saddam State Establishment)
* 11. Dhu Al Fiqar (part of Saddam State Establishment)
12. Al Ameer Factory (part of Saddam State Establishment)

* - Short Notice Inspection

The six sites marked with an asterisk were visited on short notice as a test of procedures for the longer term monitoring of equipment utilization. No difficulties with access were experienced. The interval of time between notification and the team's entry into the first building housing equipment of interest varied between 6 and 11 minutes. With the exception of the inspection at Al Hatteen, the visits to the State Establishments were uneventful. Previous inspection team equipment inventories, Iraqi Annex 3 declarations and the equipment actually in place were mutually consistent. All sealed equipment was accounted for and the seals were intact. No nuclear activities prohibited under UNSCR 687/707 were observed. Samples of metal turnings were taken at several locations for further confirmation.

18. The nine vertical flow forming machines that had been removed from Taji prior to the 17 January attack on Al Rabiyah (see IAEA-17 inspection report) have all been returned and are partially installed. The horizontal flow forming machines at the Iskandariya Car Factory and the Al Rafah Centre are installed but are not being used. The one at the Al Rafah Centre is missing electronic components. The reconstruction of buildings at Dhu Al Fiqar has been completed. Equipment destroyed by UNSCOM ballistic missile teams has been transferred to a storage area for the salvage of components. Technical specifications and manufacturer information was collected on two jet moulding machines located at the Ibn Al Haytham. This was a follow-up item from IAEA-17. Additional technical data was collected on accessories for the large oxidation furnace (intended for the centrifuge programme) located at Daura.

19. One of the material declarations in Annex 3 pertains to 12 tonnes of RDX explosive in the possession of the Al Hatteen Establishment. This material is being consumed continuously in the manufacture of various military ordnance. At the time of the inspection, 49 boxes, each containing 40 kg of RDX were presented. Corresponding production records indicate a consumption rate of about 5 tonnes per month. The material is obtained from Al Qa Qaa which holds the primary stock. The RDX production facilities located at Al Qa Qaa were destroyed in the Gulf War. During the process of verifying the stock and utilization of the RDX the inspection team visited the production lines where the artillery shell casings are machined. The workshop contained about 50 MATRIX CHURCHILL machine tools that, according to the reporting requirement established by the IAEA, should have been included in their Annex 3 declaration (the Iraqi side has long contended that the Matrix Churchill machines at Taji and other places do not meet the specifications of Annex 3 and thus do not have to be declared). The discovery of these machines at Al Hatteen was discussed with the Iraqi side where, once again, the point was made by the inspection team that all such machine tools are to be declared with a remark that, in their opinion, the performance specifications require further study. The Iraqi counterpart stated that, except for those discovered at the Al Hatteen Establishment that day, no other machine tools, identified by the inspection team to be Annex 3 relevant, remained to be declared. The inspection team returned to Al Hatteen the next day to perform a more complete inventory. Three more workshops with installed machine were visited. A total of 242 machine tools were found. This includes 94 Matrix Churchill machines, series 3 or 4 (type variation up to type 7). The general environment in which the machines are being used is extremely poor. The specifications of the machine tools are being studied. Machine tools from other manufacturers found at Al Hatteen may be included in the Annex 3 declaration once the specifications have been evaluated.

20. The Iraqi Annex 3 declaration contains a number of pieces of equipment in Al Tuwaitha - buildings 9, 82 and 90 and in warehouse 14a at Ash Shakyli. Equipment presented and tagged with identifying seals include 2 quadrupole mass spectrometers (BALZERS), 3 digital time delay generators (AVIONICS) and 9 spark gaps (LUMONICS) being used in CO_2 lasers. All items were photographed and

manufacturer information was collected where possible. Due to the time required, follow-up on other equipment, particularly electronics equipment, was left for a future inspection. A more general effort to update records regarding the contents of the Ash Shakyli general stores was initiated during IAEA-18. Ten of the 25 or so warehouses were visited. Warehouse 13b has been cleaned-up and re-organized in preparation for the move of all reactor related components and spare parts to this location as requested by the seventeenth inspection team.

21. An outstanding item across several inspections has been the verification of an inventory of mixer-settler units (METALLEXTRAKTION AB) in Iraq consistent with procurement data obtained from outside Iraq. A number of mixer-settler units located at Tuwaitha and Tarmiya were presented to the eighteenth inspection team. The inventory, by location, is

UNIT	LOCATION			
	Ash Shakyli Warehouse 13b	Tuwaitha Building 9	Tarmiya	
			Building 57	Building 74
MSU-.3			20	
MSU-.5		27		
MSU-1.5	30			
MSU-5	40			15

The Iraqi side has declared that an additional 47 MSU-.5 units had been located in Tuwaitha and were destroyed during the war. The units located in buildings at Tuwaitha and Tarmiya are declared as being used for the purification of phosphoric acid. Units at Tarmiya are also declared as being used for the extraction of vanadium from coal ashes after leaching with phosphoric acid. Samples were taken from several of the units. Although some questions remain, the inventory of mixer-settler units together with the Iraqi declaration regarding the

destroyed equipment is consistent with the procurement data. An additional fourteen .5 liter MSU units are located in building 9, Tuwaitha but they are in very poor condition. The manufacturer of these units has not yet been identified.

22. The IAEA has made a proposal to the Iraqi side to utilize the Auqba bin Nafi State Establishment as a test site for the evaluation of the effectiveness of monitoring procedures and equipment. An Iraqi response is expected by the next inspection.

INSPECTIONS RELATED TO SEARCH FOR UNDERGROUND FACILITIES

23. Information suggesting the existence of a hidden nuclear facility co-located with the electronics factory and village at Salah al Din was the focus of a major inspection effort during the eighteenth mission. This inspection objective was addressed previously by the IAEA-10 team. The eighteenth team, which included new experts, thoroughly inspected the SAAD 13 electronics factory and confirmed this factory to be of normal construction which could not support the concealment of an underground facility. The SAAD 14 housing project adjoins SAAD 13. This housing project is served by several tens of kilometers of underground utility tunnels and a number of personnel shelters. Search teams investigated the shelters and walked through critical parts of the tunnel grid. No suspicious or unexplained features were discovered. No utilities, services or transportation capabilities that would be expected to be associated with a nuclear facility were found.

24. Information from a variety of sources suggest that a large dam under construction at Badoush, near Mosul, has a number of features that could be utilized to conceal an underground facility. A team, that included an expert in dam construction visited the site over a two day period. The team started with the large concrete power station section of the dam. The Iraqi side provided information about this construction project (about 50% complete) and responded to a number of questions regarding design and construction details. All features examined

were consistent with the stated purpose of a hydroelectric generating station. There was no indication that any section of the dam is being used to conceal hidden structures or entrances or that any of the observed features could have a secondary nuclear purpose.

25. The team also inspected the earthen embankment sections of the dam, portions of which are complete. These structures are large and could conceivably hide some sort of structure. The team found, however, that there were no signs of hidden structures based on evidence including lack of physical entrances, appropriate utilities, transportation, and geology. The search included an inspection of the Jaber bin Haythan (SAAD 24) complex immediately adjacent to one large piece of the dam. This site was inspected previously during the tenth mission. There is no sign that the earth structures have been used to conceal any prohibited activities. Jaber bin Haythan is a large facility dedicated to the production of chemical warfare protective gear. The teams observed a number of ordinary machine tools and plastic molding equipment. The site is very well equipped in terms of infrastructure but utilities and equipment are not compatible with a nuclear-related function.

26. In the 1980s the Iraqi Government engaged in a number of power reactor planning and siting studies. These were open activities, carried out with the assistance of several international companies. IAEA teams have often inspected one of these sites, Ash Sharqat, a site that was originally planned for a reactor but eventually developed for an electromagnetic isotope separation plant (a replica of the one in Tarmiya). The inspection team visited four sites (Baiji, Abu Dalaf, Al Mihzam, Al Abbasiya) declared by the Iraqi side to have been the final sites under consideration for constructing an electrical power producing reactor. None of the sites was under consideration for an underground reactor. This information was consistent with certain documents available to IAEA. The siting study was a joint effort with the former Soviet Union authorities.

27. The team visited the sites by helicopter. None of the sites showed any evidence of industrial development or construction activity. The only activities that had been carried out at these sites were geological surveys such as trenching and core sampling. Radiation measurements taken at each of the sites showed only normal background.

INSPECTIONS AT DESIGNATED SITES AND OTHER ACTIVITIES

28. The Iraqi university system apparently played a small role in the original clandestine Iraqi nuclear program. Recent information has suggested that parts of the program may have been dispersed to the national universities. Specifically, equipment was alleged to have been moved to Saddam University on the campus of the University of Baghdad. The College of Science at Saddam University was therefore designated by the Special Commission.

29. A team with escorts arrived at the University to conduct a no notice inspection of the site. The Iraqi escorts requested time to consult with the Minister of Education (who is also the Chairman of the IAEC) before granting entry to a university campus. Following a period of discussion, during which the Iraqi side tried to restrict the access rights of the inspection team, the IAEA team entered the university campus with six inspectors of varying technical backgrounds and with the condition that if any proscribed activity or equipment was found, then the rest of the team (7 more inspectors) would enter. Entry to the university campus occurred about 45 minutes after notification.

30. The inspection concentrated on the College of Science based on the information provided. The facilities proved to be small, frugally equipped laboratories, offices and classrooms. Equipment, notes, and instructions in the labs provided evidence that this is a teaching institution. The level of instruction appeared to be mostly undergraduate. The facilities were not adequate for graduate research or for a serious industrial development program. In addition, security at the facility was

inconsistent with any serious compartmentalization of classified activities. A few pieces of equipment were located that seemed out of place in this environment. They were of a slightly better standard and may well have been brought in from some defunct research site. The items noted tended to be in corners, still partly in packing boxes, and generally disused. The equipment is of little significance (probably not Annex 3 relevant but the specifications are being checked) and was not being used at the time of the inspection. The opportunity was taken to walk through the remainder of the campus which was largely deserted (most staff and students had departed for the weekend). Overall the facilities appeared consistent with the stated education function.

31. The team made a short notice inspection at the Fallujah Lead Recovery Plant about 30 km west of Baghdad. It was alleged that materials from the nuclear programme had been moved to this site. The team verified that the Lead Recovery Plant has only one function, the recycling of old lead-acid car batteries. All activities and materials at this site were consistent with that function except for a group of crates containing several tonnes of precision machined black plates believed to be graphite. All markings had been removed from the crates, but some labels that may identify the manufacturer were found nearby. Samples of the material were taken for analysis. The Iraqi side explained that the material was at the Lead Recovery Plant to be made into dry cell batteries, however, the plant does not make dry cell batteries and future expansion plans do not include this function. The Iraqi side was asked to provide the team with examples of batteries made with these materials but they refused to do so. The plates look very similar to the graphite sheets seen at Ash Shakyli by the third IAEA inspection team. It seems likely that the plates found at Fallujah are actually material dispersed by the Iraqis at the end of the war and they might have been procured for manufacturing ion sources and collectors for the EMIS program.

32. The IAEA team inspected the Khan Dari warehouse complex in the area of Abu Ghrayb for the first time. The site was declared to have been used by the IAEC and other ministerial entities as a receiving point for foreign shipments. This is consistent with its location west of Baghdad, very close to the airport and to the

railroad to Jordan. Documents available to IAEA implicated this site in the context of discussions regarding the collection and removal of documents. The site is declared today to be dedicated to reconstruction activities. The inventory of the complex consisted of large quantities of stainless steel in the form of sheet, bar, tubing, and pipe. There were many plumbing fittings such as unions, elbows, and tees. There were also large quantities of ordinary steel plumbing parts, welding rod, miscellaneous building materials, and a few simple process vessels. The inventory was consistent with a receiving warehouse designed to support corrosive chemical, processed food, and pharmaceutical plant construction.

33. Documents confiscated by the IAEA teams in Iraq indicate that the former PC-3 nuclear program had an interest in the Al Mussayib Thermal Power Station south of Baghdad. PC-3 was involved in the production of hydrogen gas at this site. The inspection determined that the hydrogen was being produced as part of a vendor supplied electrical generator cooling system. The equipment was consistent with normal industrial practice. There was no indication that hydrogen was produced for other purposes or that any further processing or isotope separation was in progress or under consideration. Excess hydrogen is available from this process because two of the plant's four generators were destroyed in the war. The Iraqis denied any PC-3 direct connection with the hydrogen production. No evidence of fluorine production was observed and the potential deuterium production capability at the site is too small to be useful to the nuclear programme.

34. The large nuclear weapons related buildings at Al Atheer were destroyed in mid 1992 under IAEA team supervision. The remaining offices, labs, and warehouses have been taken over by the Iraqi defense establishment as a helicopter maintenance center. The IAEA continues to monitor the site and the general purpose equipment there that dates from the nuclear weapons program. Machine tools and materials at the site were reviewed and catalogued. One CNC electric discharge machine may fall under specifications of Annex 3 and a review of its specifications is necessary. All other items moved to the site were found to be general purpose.

35. Inspections to monitor activities at the Tarmiya, Ash Sharqat and Al Jezira sites were carried out during the eighteenth mission. The Iraqi side is obviously proceeding with their plans to develop the sites for the alternative used described to the IAEA-16 and IAEA-17 inspection teams but the promised formal proposals have yet to be received.

Tarmiya - According to Iraqi statements this site is being turned into a national center for industrial chemistry R&D. Work in that direction is currently limited to some internal modifications to building 46 (Figure 5). Small scale chemical recovery work (purification of phosphoric acid and the recovery of vanadium from coal ash) is being carried out in building 74 and in an undamaged part of building 57. Other areas, equipment stores, etc. remain unchanged.

Ash Sharqat - Three areas - Area A (electrical and mechanical work shops), Area B (main production) and Area C (chemical recovery) - that comprised the Ash Sharqat site (Figure 6) remain unchanged. However, the Iraqi side has committed to the construction of a major new facility just to the east of Area C. Their statement is that the new facility will be for the production of ammonium nitrate and sulfuric acid. The total number of buildings planned for the facility is 44. The first stage of the construction involves 19 buildings. The Iraqi side's plan is for the civil works on the first stage to be completed within 3 months and for the facility to be operational within one year.

Al Jezira - As reported earlier the Iraqi side's plan for the Al Jezira site (Figure 7) is to establish a center for the development of processes to recover minerals from indigenous ores. A small construction effort involving a new administration buildings and some additional office space (adjacent to the quality control laboratory, building 16) is nearing completion. The new administration building is occupied. Other activities at this location involve the salvage of building materials and the razing of some still standing structures on the UCl_4 and UO_2 building sites. This work is in preparation to isolate these building sites with a fence per the agreement with the IAEA-16 inspection team.

36. Brief monitoring inspections were also carried out at the Al Nafad and Al Hamath sites. The situation at the Al Nafad site remains unchanged. The main building at the Al Hamath site has been used as a warehouse. The building is in the process of being cleaned-up and the contents moved to other storage locations in the Al Tuwaitha area (e.g. Ash Shakyli). According to Iraqi statements this action is in preparation for the building to be turned over to the IAEC agriculture research programme.

36. At the beginning of the inspection the Iraqi side was reminded that their first report required by Annex 2 of the long term monitoring plan was still outstanding. This report was promised to be delivered before the end of the inspection. This deadline was not met and assurances were given to the departing team that the Iraqi side would comply with the monitoring plan requirement within two weeks. The Annex 2 declaration was delivered to IAEA on 22 April 1993. The contents have not yet been evaluated.

FIGURE 1


IRAQ'S NUCLEAR MATERIAL FLOW CHART
MINE
YELLOW CAKE
UO2
UCL4
UF4
UF6
U-METAL
E.M.I.S
CHEM. ENR.
CENTRIFUGE
FUEL FAB.
REACTOR
REPROC.
AKASHAT
AL-QAIM
ABUDUKHAR CARBONATE ORE
GEO SURV
NIGER
PORTUGAL
EURATOM
BRAZIL
AL-JESIRA
TUWAITHA
TARMIYA
HATTEN
DU= Depleted Uranium
NU= Natural Uranium
EU= Enriched Uranium
Y.C= Yellow Cake

/...

Figure 2

Layout of the Building 73 complex presented by the Iraqi authorities



FIGURE 3



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FIGURE 4

U-234/U-235 Isotopic Ratios for Materials Associated with Building 73a



/...

FIGURE 5

/...

FIGURE 6


Ash Sharqat
EMIS Uranium Enrichment Facility/ Al Fajar
New Construction
Site

/...

FIGURE 7


Mosul Feed Materials
Production Facility/Al Jazirah
New Admin.
Bldg.
New Office
Bldg.

/...

ATTACHMENT 1

IAEA-18 INSPECTION TEAM

6 March 1993

Dear Dr. Al Hajjaj,

I refer to previous discussions we have had, as well as the positive statements made by Dr. Ghaffour to Professor Zifferero during IAEA-16, on the issue of provision by Iraq of procurement data and of information on the relevant procurement network. I write now to reiterate the IAEA request for foreign procurement information that covers, inter alia, all equipment, components and raw materials which were used or intended for use in the Iraqi nuclear programme. This includes those equipment, components and raw materials used or intended for use in research and development, in the nuclear materials production facilities and in the manufacturing of components, for:

(1) Diffusion enrichment;
(2) EMIS enrichment;
(3) Centrifuge enrichment;
(4) Chemical enrichment;
(5) Reprocessing of irradiated uranium;
(6) Metallurgy of uranium and plutonium;
(7) Nuclear reactor systems - including critical and subcritical assemblies;
(8) Weaponization activities; and
(9) Chemical processes relevant to the above subjects.

For each relevant procurement, please provide the following information:

(1) A detailed description, including technical specifications, of the equipment, components or raw materials procured, including the number of items, auxiliary parts, weights and forms of raw material etc.;

(2) The name of the manufacturing company;

(3) The name of intermediate suppliers (if different from (2)) and any other companies in the procurement chain prior to final delivery):

(4) Date of procurement and date of arrival in Iraq;

(5) Date and location of initial installation or utilization and a description, where appropriate, of any installation assistance and training provided by companies and/or individuals from outside Iraq;

(6) Date of final installation (or storage) or utilization and the name of the location;

(7) The present location if different from (6);

(8) The identities of persons or companies that provided technical advice regarding the procurement and any subsequent utilization.

Guidance for equipment, components and raw materials to be included, is found in Annex 3 (July 1992) of UNSCR/715 (1991). All items should be included, even if they are not falling within the specifications stated in Annex 3, with comments from the Iraqi side about such cases.

In addition, please provide information on the provision of foreign engineering services, engineering drawings, construction contractors and architect engineers for all nuclear related installations (e.g. Tuwaitha, Al Jazirah, Tarmiya, Ash Sharqat, Al Furat, Al Atheer).

We hope to receive answers to these questions as soon as possible. However, by way of prioritization, we expect that the above answers, relevant to the procurement of the maraging steel material and manufacturing parts, already requested in Professor Zifferero's letter of 18 December 1992, will be provided to the IAEA-18 inspection team before its departure from Iraq.

Yours sincerely,

Demetrius Perricos
Chief Inspector
IAEA-18 Inspection Team

Dr. H. Al Hajjaj
Head of the Iraqi Nuclear Team
Baghdad

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ATTACHMENT 2

No. 2300/920/28

9 March 1993

Mr. Dimitri Perricos
Chief Inspector
18th Nuclear Team

Reference is made to your letter dated 6 March 1993.

Two years have elapsed since the inspection teams have been undertaking continuous work in Iraq. During the said period, the teams obtained a great deal of information about the subjects stated in your letter. Part of the information was given to you by us, while you laid hands on much of the information, in addition to those you obtained from outside sources. Therefore, dealing with general questions, as the ones included in your letter is impractical.

You now have a very wide data base on the subjects raised in your letter, while it appears from your letter as if we are starting from scratch. This is not an objective attitude and is incompatible with the actual state of affairs. It also contributes to the attempts aimed at maintaining the embargo on Iraq under non-objective pretexts.

I would like to refer to the meeting held between the Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission and Prof. Zifferero, during which we informed him that we hope to receive questions of specific nature, which we would give serious consideration.

Your letter, unfortunately, is very general. We hope to return to specifics in dealing with this subject.

With appreciation.

Abdul Halim Ibrahim Al-Hajjaj
Head of the Iraqi Side